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ADMINISTRATIVE COMPENSATION FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INJURIES: RECONCILING THE BRA VE NEW
WORLD OF PATIENT SAFETY AND THE TORTS SYSTEM

EDWARD P. RICHARDS* AND THOMAS R. McLEAN**

I. INTRODUCTION
The medical malpractice tort system is a failure.

Judged on economic

terms, more than fifty percent of the dollars are lost to transaction costs, and
the instability of the market disrupts the orderly delivery of medical care.
Judged on public-health terms, it not only fails to provide incentives for better
medical care, but its irrationality actually impedes the adoption of better
medical-care practices in several important situations. Most damning, judged
on justice terms, it prov ides inadequate or non-existent compensation to most
injured patients and undeserved win�falls to others, while forcing good doctors
to subsidize the errors of incompetent physicians, who thus gain a market edge.
Medical malpractice has been very good for the pocketbooks and political
aspiration of lawyers, but it has failed the public and health-care providers
alike.
The magnitude of the failure of the tort system has been documented in a
series of studies of substandard medical care, starting with the New York
1
Study in the 1980s and culminating in the 1999 Institute of Medicine Study
(the IOM study), To Err is Human,2 and the sequel, Crossing the Quality
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1. A. Russell Localio et al.,Relatio n Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due
to Negligence: Results of the Harvard Practice Study Ill, 325 N. ENG. J. MED. 245 (1991).
2. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN:
BUILDING A SAFER

HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000).
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These studies claimed that each year as many as 98,000 Americans

die and many more suffer significant injuries from medical mistakes, making
malpractice one of the leading causes of death. 4

The New York Study also

echoed the finding of previous studies that most injured patients did not sue for
medical malprac tice and among those who did, the sev erity of their injuries
5
and not the scientific merits of their cl aim determined their compensation.
,

Implicitly recognizing the failure of the states to deal with patient safety,
the federal government is moving forward with a national system for reviewing
the quality of medical care and disciplining errant p rov i ders. 6

While the

authors believe that the fundamental motivation for this patients' system is to
7
save money through controlling the delivery of medical care, nonetheless, it

can b e the core of an alternative to the torts system.

This article explores an

integrated quality credentialing and administrative compensation system for

medical negligence. The authors argue that such a system must replace the tort
system.

Current efforts to im p ose federal quality standards while tinkering

with concepts such as enterprise liability and no-fault compensation

as

adjuncts to the tort system will only perpetuate the injustice of the current
system.
II. T HE FAILURE OF THE TORT SYSTEM
It is important to take a hard look at the tort system and its role in medical
care. There are many powerful interests that defend the tort system in general
and the medical malpractice system in particular. 8 It both co mpensates p ersons
inj ured through negligence and deters dangerous behaviors. At the same time,
9
it is recognized that administrative law systems have several major fl aws.

3. COMM. ON QUALITY HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY

CHASM: A NEW HEALTH CARE SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2001).
See To ERR Is HUMAN, supra note 2, at l .

4.

5 . Localio. supra note I , a t 248-50.

6 The term that best describes this evolving system is "Quality Credentialing." In the past,
:
penalties have f used on fraudulent acts by providers. Under the new
system, whether the

�

�

g vemrnent or pnvate contractors reward or punish will tum on the
number of errors or near
misses that are identified in a physician's outcomes. See infra notes
107-38 and accompanying
te:i\t.
7

Patient safety is the public face of the effor t because it
is much more politicall y
the federal government i s setting up a national managed-c are

·

�

acceptable than admitting tha
syste

�

to control the prov1s1on of medical care. See generall
y Thomas R. McLean, The
.
.
Imp/1catwns of Patient
Safety Research & Risk Managed Care, 26 s. ILL. u.
L.J. 227 (2002).
8. Thomas R. McLean, Stealth v. Health: The Complex
ity of Tort Reform, 12 LEGAL MED.
PERSP. (2003), at http://www.aclm.org/publicationsflm
p.asp.
. See e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Models of Administrative
Action, 72 VA. L. REV. 363 (1986).
'
.
Adnumstrauve
law systems are antidem ocratic in that d ec1S1ons
are made by government
.
employees rather than JUrors, and these decision
s are very difficult to contest because courts give
great deference to agency decision making Id at
363 . Agenc1es can make rules that have the

�

.

·

·

·

·

·
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State boards of medical examiners are the administrative agencies currently
charged with assuring

the

quality of

medical

practice, and, with few
10
Yet

exceptions, they have wholly failed to address substandard medical care.

we believe that even an imperfect administrative compensation system will be
an improvement over the existing medical malpractice system.
Is There a Deep Pocket?

A.

The primary purpose of the tort system is to provide compensation for
persons who are injured through the negligent or intentional actions of others
11
who have a legal duty to avoid such injuries.
There are two critical
limitations on the tort system as a method of compensation. First, a tort-based
compensation requires that the negligent party have adequate resources to pay
the claim, either personally or through his own insurance. In many automobile
accident cases, the negligent party does not have adequate insurance because
the cost of a serious injury greatly exceeds the

$10,000

to

$20,000

coverage provided by most automobile liability insurance policies.

12

maximum
While the

news media focuses on huge verdicts, the truth is that in many automobile
accident cases the tort system cannot provide adequate compensation, or any
compensation at all, because the def endant is inadequately insured or not
insured.
Similarly, malpractice coverage is often inadequate for compensating the
most serious injuries. Medical malpractice coverage is generally purchased by
a provider for the minimum limits mandated by statute or by the hospital at
which the provider practices.

$1,000,000

For the most part, such policies are limited to
13
per incident and $3,000,000 total coverage per year.
As

force of law and use these rules to further limit the ability of regulated parties to contest agency
actions in court. Id. at 380-83. A gencies

are subject

to bias, and it is much hard er to disqualify a

biased agency judge than a state or federal court judge.

Most fundamentally, agencies are

criticized because they violate our notions of separation of powers by having the same agency,

and often the same people, act as investigator, prosecutor, and judge. Id.
I 0.

In some cases this is because unorthodox practitioners have powerful friends in the

legislature and get laws passed limiting the board's authority. See T o ERR IS HUMAN, supra note
2, at 70-71; CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM, supra note 3, at 24-25.
11.

Mark Geistfeld, Negligence, Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort !Aw, 91 GEO.

12.

See Insurance Information Institute, Auto Insurance Expenditures by

L.J. 585, 585 (2003).

State,

at

http://iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/auto (last visited Nov. 6, 2004).
13.

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. G A0-03-702, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS HA VE CONlRJBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES 6 (2003)
(Report to Congressional Requesters), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.ite ms/d03702.pdf
(hereinafter MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: REPORT]; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING

OFFICE, PUB. NO. GA0-04-128T, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS
HAVE

CONTRIBUTED

TO

INCREASED

PREMIUM

RATES

(2003)

(Testimony

Before

the

Subcommittee on Wellness and Human Rights, Committee on Government Reform, House of

[Vol. 49:73
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discussed in the following section on transaction costs, the plaintiff is unlikely
to get more than $500,000 to $750,000 of a $1,000,0000 award. This has to
cover both past medical bills, future lost earnings, and future medical care.
Serious injuries that require long-term medical care will have future costs in
14
the millions of dollars.
In almost all cases, multi-million dollar awards come
15
from institutional providers, usually hospitals.
Average settlement payments
by physicians in medical malpractice cases have increased from $232,000 to
$324,000 between 1998 and 2002, and the instances of multi-million dollar
16
payments by institutional providers has also increased.
Relying on
institutional providers to pay large claims further limits the cases w h ere
adequate compensation is available.

Hospitals are usually not liable for the
17
More fundamentally, the trend for

negligence of medical staff members.

years has been to move medical care out of the hospital and into the
physician's office.
The most important limitation on tort compensation is that it i s only
available, even in a limited fashion, when there is negligent treatment and that
negligence causes injury.

While the initial IOM study claims up to 98,000

deaths a year and many more injuries from substandard care, there are two
important caveats in translating that into tort compensation. First, and most
important, the IOM does not distinguish between the death of an otherwise
healthy person who might have lived for many more years and the death of a
critically ill patient who, in the absence of substandard care, might have lived
only a few days.

Second, the IOM's notion of substandard care is not

necessarily the same as negligent care.

Substandard care can be due to

Representatives), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04 l 28t.pdf. [hereinafter MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE : TESTIMONY].
14.

There is one exception, in that Louisiana has

an

administrative compensation system for

future medical costs that assures that the injured person i s cared for. This is still a tort-based
system, but once the court determines that the plaintiff is entitled to future medical care, the
responsibility for that care is shifted to a state compensation board.

There is no damage award,

but the board pays for future care. This assures that care is available and reduces the transaction
costs because the attorneys do not share in the money paid for future care. See generally Kelty v.
Brumfield, 633 So. 2d 1210 (La. 1994).
1 5.

See Berkeley Rice, Hospitals Feel the Malpractice Pain, MED. ECON., Oct. 10, 2003, at

37.
16. Gail Garfinkel Weiss, Malpractice: Don't Wait For a Lawsuit to Strike, MED. ECON.,
March 22, 2003, at 83; Press Release, Physician Insurers Association of America, PIAA, NPDB
Data Show Medical Malpractice Costs Still Rising; NPDB Puts Total Payout Increase at 8%
(May 4, 2004), available at http://www.thepiaa.org/pdf_files/20040504.
17.

Most medical staff members are independent contractors and the hospital will only be

liable for their negligence if the hospital itself was negligent in allowing the physician to join or
remain on the medical staff, or if a hospital employee such as a nurse was also negligent. See,

e.g., Schlotfeldt v. Charter Hosp. of Las Vegas, 910 P.2d 271, 274 (Nev. 1996); Candler Gen.
Hosp., Inc. v. Persaud, 442 S.E.2d 775, 776-77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1 994). See also BARRY R. FuRROW
ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS, ch. 6 (4th ed. 2001).
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inadequate community resources, limitations on medical insurance coverage,
and other factors that are failings of the health-care system, not health-care
The vast majority of

provider negligence.

complications from medical

treatment, even the most devastating complications, are the unpreventable
c o nsequences of non-negligent treatments for serious diseases.
There is no compensation for unavoidable complications other than the
individual's own medical and disability insurance coverage, so-called "first
person insurance."

Because many people do not have this coverage, either

because they cannot afford it or because they choose not to buy it, serious
illness and treatment complications often result in financial ruin.

This is a

tragedy that is not addressed by the tort system. It is also one that subverts the
tort system because juries are often swayed by the stories of severely in jured
persons who are in need, even when the scientific facts do not support their
claim that the injuries were due to negligence.
B.

Transaction Costs

The transaction costs of the tort system are the second reason for its
failure.

They consume most of the dollars paid for medical malpractice

insurance, and they also make it economically impossible for the majority of
persons injured through negligence to seek compensation through the tort
system.

There are

three

major transaction costs in tort-based

medical

negligence compensation:

1) Contingent fees, expenses, and plaintiffs attorney opportunity costs;
2) Defense lawyer's costs; and
3) Costs of health-care provider's direct and indirect expenses.
Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs have received the most media attention.
Contingent fees can run up to fifty percent of the award if the case is appealed.
Some states, such as California and Illinois, have capped contingent fees.
Contingent fees are only part of the costs of case preparation.

18

Case

investigation often requires the work of many professionals other than the
attorneys, and there are costs for copying records, traveling to talk to
witnesses, and the single largest expense, paying physician expert witnesses.
In most contingent fee contracts the plaintiff is responsible for the costs even if
there is no recovery, although many attorneys waive the costs if there is no

18.

California caps contingent fees at forty percent of the first $50,000, thirty-three and one

third percent of the next $50,000, twenty-five percent of the next $500,000, and fifteen percent of
any amount that exceeds $600,000. CAL.

Bus. & PROF. CODE§ 6146 (West 2004).
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recovery and the client is not well-off.

19

[Vol. 49:73

These costs can run up to many

thousands of dollars, sometimes as much as $50,000 to $100,000 in a complex
case taken to trial.
Because there is no direct recovery of attorney fees in tort cases in most
states, the fees and costs must come from the plaintiffs proven damages,
assuring that unless there is a large pain and suffering award, the plaintiffs
actual recovery after all costs and fees will be a fraction of the real damages.
The combination of costs and contingent fees-even in a state like California
that caps fees-can consume most of the award.

If there is an inadequate

award, the attorney loses the value of the time spent preparing the case, so the
potential recovery must be great enough to pay the costs, give the attorney a
fair return on his time, and leave enough money to benefit the client.
Defense costs receive much less public scrutiny but can equal or exceed
plaintiffs ' attorneys' costs because they are incurred in all cases, unlike
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, which are only paid in cases where there is a
settlement or a plaintiffs jury verdict. Defense costs include attorney time,
almost always billed at an hourly rate, costs of case-related services such as
copying and travel, and expert witness costs.

Defense costs increase as the

case gets closer to trial, with costs rising dramatically in the weeks before trial
as attorneys prepare for and then participate in the trial. Early settlements or
dismissals limit defense costs but also limit the revenue of the defense lawyers,
creating potential conflicts.

It is not unusual for defense costs to exceed

$200,000 in cases litigated to a verdict, which means even a win for the
defense is a significant loss to the medical malpractice insurer or to the
corporate defendant paying its own attorneys.
Health-care providers involved in medical malpractice litigation have
significant direct and indirect costs that are not covered by medical malpractice
insurance. Direct costs include lost time from practice while participating in
the preparation and trial of the case, retaining a personal lawyer to oversee the
case if there is a chance the verdict will exceed the insurance limits and
'
potential loss of business due to adverse publicity. The emotional cost is also
very high. For many physicians, the lawsuit becomes the single focus of their
lives for years, disrupting all other aspects of their lives. Some even commit
20
suicide.

19.

Samuel R. Gross, We Could Pass a Law . . . What Might Happen if Contingent Legal

Fees Were Banned,

47 DEPAUL L. REV. 321, 321-22 (1998). This is an important issue because

the majority of claims do not result in any payout.
20. For an i nteresting look at the emotional cost of medical malpractice cases on both
physicians and plai ntiffs, see SARA c. CHARLES & EUGENE KENNEDY, DEFENDANT: A
PSYCHIATRIST ON TRIAL FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ( 1986).

2004]
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The Impact of Transaction Costs
T ransaction

costs

for

medical malpractice

compensation impact

the

fairness of the system. Most plaintiffs who get a recovery receive fifty percent
or less of the actual settlement or verdict. The recovery of non-economic
damages-pain and suffering-is a response to the problem, allowing the jury
to top off the award so that the plaintiff talces home closer to the real costs of
compensation.

This is not the case with settlements, however, which are

usually at a discount to the patient's true compensation needs .

For plaintiffs

who get little or no recovery, the process of spending several years focused on
the lawsuit, with considerable perso nal sacrifice in many cases, is embittering
and only com plicates their recovery.
The second impact is that plaintiffs with smaller claims cannot afford
representation. While the cutoff for an economically valid claim under the

contingent fee system is, at best, an apocryphal number, conventional wisdom

is that a claim must have provable damages of at least $100,000, and many
1
specialist firms want damages in the $500,000 range.2 As with most types of

injury data, the most severe injuries are only a small part of the total number of
injuries.

Data from the New York study showed that few cases of iatrogenic

injuries lead to legal claims. 22
severity of the injury. 23

The most important determinant was the

While the less severe injuries would support smaller

awards, their frequency would make the total payouts much larger in a system
.
. h smaIIer transaction
wit
costs. 24
Thus, there are two powerful incentives to maintain high transaction costs.

First, the lawyers on both sides have little interest in any reform that would
lower lawyer costs.

Second, the medical malpractice insurers have no

incentive to lower transaction costs in any way that would make it cheaper to
bring a claim.

As plaintiffs' lawyers rightly complain, all the efforts at tort

reform are aimed at reducing the number of claims and reducing the potential
awards for a given claim, not increasing the justice of the system for plaintiffs.

D.

Deterrence
Defenders of the tort system argue that deterrence plays an important role

in improving medical care.

Tort law can deter activities that are not

economically viable when their profits are offset by the internalization of the

2 1 . Ironically, while there is much discussion of frivolous claims, as if plaintiffs with minor
pr oblems are flooding the court system, Jaw finns seldom bring claims unless there are major
injuries. The conflict is whether the injury was caused by the care and the appropriate standard of
care.

22. Localio, supra note l, at 247.
23. Id. at 249.
24. See generally Don Harper Mills, Medical Insurance Feasibility Study: A Technical
Summary 1 28 W. J. MED. 360 ( 1 978).

[Vol. 49:73
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cost of the injuries they cause.

Compensation through tort law serves to
More accurately,

internalize the cost of injuries caused by an activity.
deterrence happens

when

the profits

of

an activity

are offset

by

the

combination of the cost of compensation and the transaction costs associated
with claims for compensation.
compensation paid out.

Sometimes deterrence is based on the cost of

More commonly, deterrence is really due to the

actions of public regulators, such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission
or the Department of Transportation. While tort claims may bring problems to
the attention of regulators, just as often, regulators bring problem s to the
attention of the tort bar.

In some cases, the cost of defending unfounded

claims can drive a safe drug from the market, as happened with Bendectin, a
25
drug designed to manage severe nausea in pregnant women.
Deterrence also
acts through the fear of insurers. If insurers are concerned that an activity will
attract litigation, they will refuse to insure it.
Opponents of tort reform and alternatives to the tort system argue that
deterrence is very important to encourage health-care providers to practice
better medicine. The best, and perhaps only significant example was the use of
litigation fears to hasten the adoption of monitoring standards for general
26
In this case
a nesthesia, in particular the use of oximetry and capnography.
the deterrence theory was that lawyers would convince courts that such
monitoring was the standard of care and that anesthesiologists who did not use
the monitors would be impossible to defend. This contributed to the rapid
27
adoption of monitoring standards,
with a dramatic reduction in medical
malpractice claims agai nst anesthesiologists and the lowering of their medical
malpractice insurance rates.

The interesting lesson from this was that there

was no litigation over failure to use these devices at the time the standards
were adopted. The tort lawyers were used as bogeymen to hasten the adoption
28
of the new standards by the anesthesia professional organizations.
This is an isolated example.

The introduction of fetal monitoring for

pregnant women led to the opposite result, a significant increase in legal
29
claims.
In some cases there have been changes in the behavior of medical

25.

Once Maligned Morning Sickness Drug Preparing for Comeback, Oct. 10, 2000,

avai lable at http://archives.cnn.com/2000/HEALTH/women. For an example of one of the many
lawsuits, see Daubert
26.

v.

Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

STANDARDS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS (1987). See also Jay

B. Brodsky, What Intraoperative Monitoring Makes Sense?, 115 CHEST l O l S, 102S (1999).
27.

HARVARD MED ICAL PRACTICE STUDY PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL
,

INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK (1990).

28.

This was orchestrated through the Anesthesia Safety C ounsel, a group of experts

including Professor Richards, which was funded by the major manufacturer of oximeters.

The

manufacturer wanted to improve patient safety but also wanted to sell its machines. It was very
successful at both efforts.
29.

See generally Edward P. Richards & Charles Walter, How Effective Safet y Devices Lead

to Secondary litigation, 10 IEEE ENG'G IN MED . & BIOLOGY 66 (1991).
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care providers but no evidence that this has· improved the quality of medical
care. The best example may be the extensive paperwork that physicians must
complete to apply for state licensure or medical staff privileges. This usually
includes references from every position that the physician held since medical
school, and it is repeated by every institution that the physician deals with.
While it may have eliminated a few impostors, there is no evidence that it has
improved the quality of medical care. It has just increased the cost of care.
More generally,

the

dark side of deterrence is defensive medicine.

Defensive medicine is the ordering of diagnostic tests and the hospitalization
of patients because the physician fears that failing do so will lead to litigation
if the patient's course is not as predicted. What physicians fear is that they will
be second-guessed for failing to make the correct diagnosis and that ordering
extra tests or putting the patient in the hospital will show that they did
30
There is little support for the effectiveness of defensive
everything possible.
31
medicine, but many physicians are convinced that they must do it.

E.

Why Does Deterrence Fail?
Deterrence fails for three reasons. First, the timeframe is wrong. Medical

malpractice claims are paid years after negligent actions, making it very
difficult for physicians to make the link between their behavior and the payout.
More important, if the unsafe behavior is one that increases the profits of the
physician, the hospital, or the managed-care plan, changing the behavior today
costs real dollars, while the cost of potential claims in the future is only a
theoretical risk: The discount rate of future claims to net present day value is
very high. This behavior is economically rational because in many cases the
potential profits from the practice patterns that create the litigation risk are
higher than the incremental tort risk.
Second, medical malpractice insurance provides very little incentive to
change individual behavior.

Most malpractice insurance is not individually

rated. All of the physicians practicing the specialty in a given community pay

30. Defensive medicine causes injuries, but a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this

article. See generally Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Managed Care Liability for

Breach of Fiduciary Duty After Pegram v. Herdrich: The End of ER/SA Preemption for State Law
Liability for Medical Care Decision Making, 53 FLA. L. REV. l (2001); Edward P. Richards &

Thomas R. McLean, Physicians in Managed Care: A Multidimensional Analysis of New Trends

in Liability and Business Risk, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 443 (1997).

See also Richard Hayward,

VOMIT (Victims of Modern Imaging Technology)-An Acronym for Our Times, 326 BRIT. MED.

J. 1273 (2003), available at http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/contentlfull.

31. Because someone will be paid for doing those tests or for time the patient spends in the
hospital, there are other incentives for institutions to encourage this belief in the necessity of
defensive medicine.

One never hears of physicians saying that they have to spend more time

talking to patients to prevent litigation, although this is perhaps the single most important way to
reduce claims.
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the same rate and share the losses. In a classic "commons" problem, there is
32
little personal incentive for a physician to chan g e his behavior.
In fact,
because physicians usually do not pay based on the volume of their work, there
is an incentive to do as many risky but profitable procedures as possible
because that increases the income for the same malpractice insurance
33
payment.
Thus all neurosurgeons pay very high malpractice insurance rates
because some of them do a lot of unnecessary back surgery, which results in
malpractice claims. Surgeons who do not do unnecessary procedures subsidize
the medical malpractice insurance for surgeons who do.
The third reason deterrence fails is the large number of medically
unfounded claims that are brought and settled, or in which plaintiffs get a jury
verdict.

As discussed previously, in the analysis of transaction costs,

plaintiffs' attorneys have powerful financial incentives to not bring medical
34
malpractice cases unless the patient has major injuries.
However, if the client
has a major injury with long-term consequences, a skillful attorney can
persuade a jury to overlook technical issues such as whether the physician
followed the standard of care or whether the injuries were caused by the
physician's actions at all.
This is a critical point: The legal notion of a frivolous claim is profoundly
different from what physicians think of as a frivolous claim.

In the legal

world, any claim you can win without violating the code of professional
conduct is a valid claim, and you are obliged to bring it on behalf of your
35
This is the source of
client-if you undertake the client's representation.
36
much cognitive dissonance in the medical legal world.
The breast-implant litigation is a typical example. By all scientific criteria,
37
By professional legal criteria it

the litigation was unfounded and frivolous.

32. There is some adjustment based on which invasive procedures are performed; for
example, family practitioners who deliver babies will pay a much higher rate than those w h o d o
not.
33. One of the interesting provisions of the Virginia birth injuries compensation program

discussed herein is that it is paid for by a per birth charge. While not discussed in the legislative
analysis noted in the article, this might explain why many physicians do not participate; large
volume practices might find conventional insurance, which is not rated by the number of births,
cheaper, even through their risk is much higher.
34. See supra text accompanying notes 2�24.
35.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 ("Meritorious Claims and Contentions"); see

FED. R. CIV. P. 11; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l. l 6 (discussing declining or
terminating representation).
36.

This is why the current tort reform proposal to bar claims by attorneys who have filed

three frivolous claims is unworkable. The legal system already has sanctions for attorneys who
file frivolous claims. FED. R. Crv. P. l l. Adding new sanctions does not address the problem that
it is not unethical to bring a claim you can win, even if the science is against you.
37.

See Gina Kolata, Panel Confirms No Major Illness Tied to Implants, N.Y. TIMES, June

21, 1999, at A I. The final settlement exceeded 4 billion dollars. Id.
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None of the expert testimony used by the plaintiffs was

credible in the scientific world, but because judges are allowed to use their
own version of science in admitting testimony, these cases were allowed to go
to trial and sympathetic juries awarded millions of dollars.38

As long as the

duty of an advocate is to find an expert to support his client's case, not to find
an impartial expert, medical malpractice law will send a hopelessly muddled
deterrence signal. 39 Thus, claims are settled for various reasons, including the
difficulty in explaining to the jury that the physician's wrongful act did not
cause the plaintiff's injury; because the defendant has a difficult personality
that the jury will dislike; or because juries typically rule for children whom
they see as deserving, or any combination of reasons. All of these are perfectly
a cceptable legal reasons to bring a claim. All lead to the payment of medically
unfounded claims.40

The aggregate effect of these false positive and false

negative signals from the medical malpractice system is to convince physicians
that medical malpractice claims are random events.41

Secondarily, paying

verdicts and settlements that are based on medically unsound practices or
scientifically unsupported claims sends a message to health-care providers and
the

public that such practices are acceptable.

Important examples

are

unfounded claims that childhood vaccines cause injuries such as autism.
While there is no evidence to support such claims, the massive media attention
to

such claims and their

pervasive

presence

on

websites supported

by

plaintiffs' attorneys has even convinced some health-care providers that
vaccinations are dangerous and should be avoided.42

38.

See David S. Caudill & Richard E. Redding, Junk P h ilosophy

Thus, rather than a

ofScience?: The Paradox

of Expertise and Interdi sciplinarity in Federal Courts, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 685, 715--16

(2000).

While Daubert is seen by many as reducing the a dmission of bad science, this is not

necessarily the case. See id. The only cases that are seen on appeal

are

those where evidence has

been excluded, i.e., where Daubert works. If the evidence is admitted, it is much more difficult to
appeal the case, creating a profound selection bias against seeing cases where Daubert fails.

3 9. Judges bear most responsibility here. Most state c o des and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure allow judges to appoint special masters, neutral experts on technical matters, but
judges almost never do this. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53. This would be a powerful check on the duty
of zealous advocacy.

See Gen. Elec. Co.

Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149 (1997) (Breyer, J.,

v.

concurring).

40. It is important to note that plaintiffs also suffer under this system. Plaintiff s who are
unsympathetic to a jury are at a disadvantage. Defense attorneys are subject to the same ethical
rules as plaintiffs' attorneys and al s o use scientifically unfounded evidence to support their cases.

41. See William Meadow et al., Physicians' Experience with Allegations of Medical
Malpractice in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit PEDIATRICS, May 1997, at I. Moreover, it must
,

be recog nized that what limited data is available on medical malpractice claims is suboptimal
because of selection bias of the reporting sources.

42. See Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans Opting
Out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 353 (2004).
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anecdotal claims
deterrent, the tort system often encourages the worst sort of
.
43
l practice.
1ca
and runs contrary to all principles of scientifically based med.
nce
The example of oximetry to reduce anesthesia injuries and neglige

obstetric
claims against anesthesiologists, compared to efforts to reduce
of
medical malpractice claims, illustrates a key point in this error signal theory
s
deterrence failure. As the anesthesiologist who was one of the developer of

pulse oximetry explained it, oximetry is so simple even a surgeon can
understand it. What he meant was that most anesthesia accidents, of whatever

cause, had the common effect of injuring the patient through reducing the
oxygen in the patient's blood. The oximeter of those days was a simple device
that measured oxygen in the patient's blood in real time and beeped when it
was too low. Everyone in the operating room could hear the beep, including
the surgeon, who would know what it meant and could then make sure that the
44
This was a simple, relatively
anesthesiologist checked on the patient.
inexpensive technological fix that promised to reduce claims by reducing
injuries and, conversely, to increase claims if it was not used because it would
be so easy for the plaintiffs attorney to claim it was negligent to not use it.
In contrast, there is no easily detected common cause of birth injuries,
which are the biggest cause of obstetric claims. Scientific evidence shows that
many birth injuries that result in huge jury awards are not due to the
obstetrician's negligence at all but are the result of chronic conditions of the
45
placenta or other unpreventable events.
There is no simple solution to birth
injuries that obstetricians can be frightened into using through fears of
litigation. This is much more typical of medical negligence than the simple
technical fix of oximetry.
Ironically, there is a way to reduce birth injury claims, but because it does
not address any single simple p roblem, the tort system does not provide a clear
signal to use it. Advanced Medical Systems has developed a structured system
46
of patient records and patient information materials to deliver prenatal care.
It a ssures that all necessary p renatal tests and examinations are conducted, and,
47
as importantly, documents this in a clear and unambiguous record.
The result
43. Some states have attempted to limit these unfounded claims by using medical review
panels. To the author's knowledge, none of these laws make the panel's finding binding, i .e. , the
plaintiff is not allowed to bring an unfounded claim or the defen dant cannot defend a valid claim.
They do encourage the settlement of claims that the panel finds meritorious.
selection bias in the cases that

are

This creates a

tried, making it look like the panels are biased against plaintiffs

because the only cases seen on appeal are ones in which the plaintiff lost at the panel.
44.

This was important because a major source of anesthesia injuries was anesthesiologists

who were inattentive or even out of the room.
45. Patricia King Urbanski, Placental Evaluation: Pregnancy's Black
Box?, A WHONN
LIFELINES, April 1997, at 54-55.
46. ADVANCED MED. SYS. , INC., PRENATAL
http://www.amsintl.com (Last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
47.

Id.

CARE-A

SYSTEMS

APPROACH,

at
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is that even if there is a birth injury, it is very difficult to show any negligence
because it is easy to show the jury that everything was done correctly and that
the patient was properly informed at all times.

Physicians using this system

have claims at the rate of about 1/100,000 deliveries, dramatically lower than
48
those who do not u s e the system.
The lack of attention to this and other
structured approaches to prenatal care, in the face of huge problems with
obstetric medical malpractice claims, is perhaps the best evidence of the failure
of deterrence.

F.

The Medical Malpractice Insurance Business
The medical malpractice insurance system causes problems far beyond its

contribution to the costs of health care. While reliable numbers are difficult to
come by, the total cost of medical malpractice insurance premiums has never
49
exceeded one to two percent of the total medical care budget.
Even the most
inflated estimates of defensive medicine do not raise the total to more than five
so
percent of the medical care budget.
Yet physicians claim they are leaving
practice because of insurance costs, and others claim to be leaving states such
s1
as Mississippi because of insurance cost and availability.
How can such a
small part of the health-care budget have such a disproportionate effect on
s2

physicians?

The cost of medical malpractice insurance is not evenly distributed across
the participants in the health-care delivery system. Under recent United States
s3
Supreme Court case law, medical care insurers, through which most of the
private money in health care flows, have almost complete immunity from
54
Conversely, physician practices, which account
medical malpractice claims.

48.

Id.

49.

See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No GA0-03-836, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:

IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE 26-29 (2003).
50. See generally id.
51.

Id. 30-36; see a lso FRED J. HELLINGER & WILLIAM E. ENCINOSA, THE IMPACT OF

STATE LAWS LIMITING MALPRACTICE AWARDS ON THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF
PHYSICIANS (2003) (prepared for the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)), a t
http://www.ahrq .gov/research/tortcaps.
52.

In part, the disproportionate effect on Medical Doctors is related to two decades of

managed care and Medicare cuts that has made the profit margins of some physicians razor thin.

See Thomas R. McLean, Using the Market to Regulate Health Care Price: Why Heart Hospitals
Will Have a Competitive Advantage in the World of Post-Diagnostic Related Group Pricing, 2
AM. HEART HOSP. J. 1 65, 1 65 (2004).
53.

Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 1 24 S. Ct. 2488, 2 5 0 2 (2004). This freedom from liability is

in part related to the complex nature of this case and the complex functions (medical oversight
and risk dispersion) that the HMO had taken on.
54.

Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, The "Aetna Health " Ruling, NAT L L.J.,
'

Aug. 30, 2004, at 1 2; Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Health Care 's " Thirty Years

War": The Origins and Dissolution of Managed Care, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 2 83, 3 1 6-
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for only about twenty-five percent of the health-care budget, bear most of the
costs of the medical malpractice system.55

Among physicians, rates are set

state-by-state and are based on specialty practice, certain procedures , and
geographic areas.56 As the number of physicians in a rating group decreases,
the averaging effect decreases, increasing the volatility of the rates.57

The

level and quality of the state ' s insurance commission affects the volatility of
the rates, as do issues such as the accuracy of risk estimation by the insurer, the
rate of return on money invested by the insurer to cover future claims, the cost
of reinsurance, and the actual claims paid out on the groups of physicians. 58
Rates are also affected by state tort law practices and tort reform laws,
although GAO studies do not demonstrate any consistent pattern for the effect
of the reforms.59 While most physician groups point to California' s tort reform
package as having stabilized rates in that state, it is impossible to sort out the
influence of other factors, especially the size of the state and the huge
physician base over which the claims can be averaged.60
Rates alone are only part of the problem.

The most acute problem is

availability of insurance. Major medical malpractice insurance carriers have a
pattern of leaving states when the insurance cycle turns down, reducing the
profitability of their product.61

This was less of an issue in the 1 970s, when

most coverage was written as occurrence policies, i.e., if you were insured in
1 975 and a claim was made against you in 1 979, it was paid for by your 1 975
policy.62 This created a long tail on claims because the insurer had to predict
the cost of covering claims in the future, making it difficult to set rates.63 One
of the responses to the 1970s medical malpractice insurance rate crises was to
change coverage to claims-made policies.64 Claims-made insurance only pays
claims that are brought within the effect date of the policy.65 Thus, you have to
keep buying insurance, even if you are no longer in practice or even alive. If

17 (2004). This remains true despite the reality that many practices that lead to patient injuries
are the result of managed care financial policies.

55. The usual structure of hospital staffs keep the physicians as independent contractors, so
the hospitals are only liable for the small group of employed physicians, for the actions of their
staff that are done at the direction of a physician, and for failing to properly credential medical
staff members.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See MEDI CAL M ALPRACTICE INSURAN CE REPORT, supra note 13.
Id.; see also HELLINGER & ENCINOSA, supra note 5 1 .
See MEDICAL M ALPRACTICE INSURAN CE: REPO RT, supra note 1 3 .
See generally id.

There are also informal reports that the claims frequency is rising in California,
which
may destabilize the rates in the long term.

6 1 . MEDI CAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: REPORT, supra note 1 3 , at 37-38.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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you stay with the same insurer for all of your practice years, you only notice
the difference between claims made and occurrence insurance when you leave
practice or change states .

At that point you have to buy tail coverage, an

additional policy that covers any claims made for care rendered during your
primary policy coverage. Depending on the company' s policy, the cost of tail
coverage can be inexpensive or can cost several times a single year's premium.
The problem is that tail coverage costs are not regulated effectively in
many states, so that if an insurer leaves the state, its policyholders will have to
buy tail coverage as a high and unexpected expense. The alternative is to pay a
66
surcharge to the successor insurer so that the new insurer will cover claims
based on care rendered under the previous policy.

As with the tail coverage,

this surcharge comes as a large and unexpected expense.

In the worst c ase,

there will not be any insurers in the state willing to write coverage, leaving the
physician bare and unable to continue practice since most hospitals require
insurance for hospital medical staff privileges.
Thus, the medical malpractice insurance system has two major flaws.
First, even when it is working well and the rates are stable and reasonably
related to physician ' s income, it provides little incentive for individual
67
physicians to practice risk management.
While private insurers will refuse to
write coverage for physicians with a lot of losses, that is a sufficiently remote
68
threat that has little impact on the day-to-day practice of the insured.
Second,
over the long run, it has proven to be unstable because of the insurance cycle.
This leaves physicians facing unexpected rate increases or surcharges and even
leaves them with the threat of no coverage.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO THE TORT SYSTEM
Physicians and hospitals are the major proponents of tort reform, so it is
not surprising that most tort reform efforts attempt to affect the insurance side
of the problem by limiting the potential awards, by using screening panel s to
reduce the cost of dismissing scientifically unfounded cases, and by limiting

66.

This is commonly known as nose coverage.

67.

There are some exceptions.

The COPIC Insurance Company in Colorado, which was

formed by physicians in Colorado in response to the uncertainty of the insurance market in the
state, developed risk management standards in several important areas and required their insured
to follow the standards. See Copiscope Newsletter, available at http://callcopic.com/publications/
copiscope.htm (COPIC's risk management newsletter, published bi-monthly).

68.

Many states have state-managed alternatives to private medical insurance for physicians

who cannot get coverage in the private market, thus removing even the threat of non-coverage. In
Louisiana, for example, the state fund is limited to charging a small surcharge for physicians with
a bad claims history, making it difficult to remove such physicians from the insurance system.

See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1 299.44 (West 200 1 ) .
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There are three other major alternatives that have

been proposed by researchers and by business groups. While none of these

�as

gained much support, it i s important to understand why they are not effective
alternatives to administrative compensation.
A.

Binding Arbitration

B inding arbitration is used extensively to control litigation costs in other
industries. While some states putatively ban arbitration agreements for medical
malpractice cases, such bans have been rejected by the United States Supreme
70
Court as preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.
Arbitration can limit
unfounded claims and scientifically implausible claims and can eliminate
outlier jury awards.

Arbitration can reduce the transaction costs, but only if

plaintiffs' attorneys adjust their fee agreements and defense attorneys do not
prepare the cases as if they were going to trial.

Some health-care providers
71
have used arbitration to reduce the cost of managing negligent injuries.
The biggest hurdles to binding arbitration are physician fears, which are
encouraged by defense attorneys who are skeptical of binding arbitration.
Physicians are frightened of arbitration because it is seen as always trying to
give something to both sides. The almost uniform adoption of arbitration by
securities dealers seems to indicate that this is not a significant monetary
problem, but the requirement that malpractice settlements be reported to the
National Practitioner Database makes physicians unwilling to accept a system
72
that is seen as more likely to give an award.
Insurers are ambivalent about
arbitration because of data that shows that reducing the transaction costs will
increase overall payments.

Because their interest is in controlling overall

payments, not in assuring fair compensation, cost-effective arbitration would
be a threat to their bottom line.

Arbitration might improve the deterrence

signal if it reduced awards without scientific merit, but because it has not been
used extensively in medical malpractice cases, there is not empirical support
for its effect on deterrence.

69. Caps on plaintiffs' attorneys' fees do shift a bit more money to the injured person, but at
the potential cost of further limiting the claims that can be economically litigated.

70. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); see also Doctor' s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 5 1 7 U.S. 68 1 , 68687 (1 996) (preempting Montana state statute); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 480, 490-491 ( 1 987)
(preempting California labor law); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S . I, 1 6- 1 7 ( 1 984)
(preempting California state statute).

7 1 . Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67, 7 1 (Cal. 1999).
72. Joseph T. Hallinan, Attempt to Track Malpractice Cases is Often Thwarted, WALL ST. J.,

�

Aug 27, 2004, at Al. Be ause there is no evidence that the National Practitioner Databank really
'
.
.
proVIdes useful mformat1on about claims payments, its benefits may be outweighed by the
adverse effect on more efficient claims settlement procedures . Id.
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Enterprise Liability
Enterprise liability is the liability of businesses and other organizations for

the negligent acts of their employees.

It is a well-established concept that is

very important in other areas of tort law. Outside of health care, torts against
businesses almost always involve enterprise liability through the doctrine of
respondeat superior, under which the employer is responsible for the negligent
acts of the employee or agent when those actions are within the course and
73
scope of employment or further the interests of the enterprise.
Enterprise
liability greatly increases the chance that there will be enough money to pay a
claim. It also provides a corporate defendant that is usually less sympathetic to
the j uror than the individual plaintiff.

Enterprise liability does enhance

deterrence for claims that the company can cheaply control by controlling its
work force. In most cases this means screening out workers who pose a risk,
such

as those who have been convicted of crimes.

It also encourages

businesses to assure that employees obey laws such as those against drunk
74
Enterprise liability only addresses the transaction
driving on company time.
costs in the tort system if it is coupled with modifications in the standards for
proving liability. For example, most states have reduced the burden of proving
75
a case against the manufacturer of a product.
This was done as a form of
76
enterprise liability, in that the enterprise was the manufacturing sector.
The
rationale was that making tort cases for defective products easier to prove
would reduce the cost of the cases for plaintiffs, shifting the cost of injury to
77
manufacturer.
If there were significant savings in the products liability
system, few were passed on to the plaintiffs.

More generally, enterprise

liability does not affect the portion of tort costs going to injured persons and
exemplifies the disconnect between awards and the standard of care of the
underlying medical care.
Traditional enterprise liability is very limited in health care.

The major

institutions in health care are hospitals and nursing h o mes, but in most cases
they do not employ the physicians who practice there. Historically, state laws
against the corporate practice of medicine prevented physicians from working

73.

WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON

AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 47-80 (5th ed .

74.

2003).

See EEOC v. Exxon Corp . , 203 F.3d 87 1 , 872 (5th Cir. 2000). The Exxon Valdez case

may be the largest award against a company for a simple negligent act, although it is not clear that
the Americans with Disabilities Act would have allowed Exxon to have disciplined the captain to
prevent the accident.
75.

JERRY J. PHILLIPS ET AL. , PRODUCTS LIABILITY: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 1 0 1 -

20, 1 47-269 (2d ed. 2002).
76.
77.

Id.
Id.

Reducing the standard of proof in products injury cases had the unintended

consequence of encouraging unfounded claims, such as those against the breast implant and
vaccine manufacturers. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
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for hospitals and other lay-run medical businesses. Instead, they are treated as
independent contractors. A hospital is only liable for negligence of a medical
staff member when the hospital was itself negligent in admitting the physician
to the medical staff, allowing the physician to remain on the medical staff, or
78
when an actual hospital employee is negligent.
If the physician works for a
79
group practice or a managed-care company, that employer is liable.
Paul C. Weiler and Kenneth S. Abraham proposed a system of vicarious
liability in which hospitals, the major enterprise in the medical system, would
80
be responsible for iatrogenic adverse events. This would require fundamental
changes in the legal relationship between hospitals and physicians.

It makes

some economic sense in that the hospitals account for a larger share of health
spending and thus could better bear the cost of the malpractice insurance.
However, it ignores the trend to move care out of hospitals

and into

ambulatory care centers, which has accelerated since the paper was written.
Even the notion of hospitals has changed with the advent of specialty care
81
hospitals,
which avoid the community care obligations of traditional
82
h ospitals.
An alternative system, which is at the root of the no-fault
proposals, is to treat the entire health-care system as the enterprise and thus
spread the cost of compensation over the industry.

If this were done as a

general tax on health care it would address the problem of the availability of
medical malpractice insurance but not the other problems with a tort based
compensation system.
Some of the researchers who did the IOM Study argue that increasing
83
enterprise liability will increase the deterrence effect of tort law and cause
these institutions to discipline physicians to reduce patient injuries.

This

presupposes that there is a deterrence effect from tort law and that this effect
would be more powerful for institutions. The major reasons that physicians do
not feel a deterrence effect-the wrong time frame and mixed signals-are, if
anything, more significant for institutions.

7 8 . Darling

v.

79. Lancaster

Major businesses of all kinds,

Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 21 1 N.E.2d 253, 256-57 (Ill. 1965).
v.

Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1 1 37 ,

1 1 49-50 (E.D. Va. 1 997).
80.

Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution

of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 38 1 , 393-94 ( 1994).

8 1 . These specialty hospitals, which are often owned b y the same physicians who operate i n
them, may end up under enterprise liability because of the identity between control and medical
practice.
82. Thomas R. McLean,

Cybersurgery: Innovation

or a Means to Close Commu nity

Hospitals and Displace Physicians, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 495, 497 (2002).

?nly are hospitals going to become few in years to come but with the rise of specialty
.
hospitals, the hospllal system is atomizing. Thomas R. McLean, The Rise of the Heart Hospital

Not

and the Fall of the House of Usher, 1 AM. HEART HOSP. J. 223, 223 (2003).

83. This would be done both through forcing physicians to work for large health-care
businesses and by limiting the independent contractor defense for hospitals.

2004)
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including health-care institutions, do their financial planning on short time
frames.

There is pressure to show profits each quarter, and a year is a very

long time in a rapidly changing business such as health care. Because payouts
on medical malpractice claims happen years after the incident and there is no
direct link between risk management efforts and insurance rates, health-care
enterprises put a high net present-day discount on any efforts to prevent future
medical malpractice claims. If the physicians who are putting the institution at
risk are also generating significant billing for the hospital, any long-term
savings will be more than offset by short-term losses. Unlike dealing with the
driving habits of low-level employees, disciplining high-risk but high-grossing
physicians has real short-term costs that make it unlikely that enterprises will
b e any more susceptible to deterrence than individual physicians.

If the

institution is under significant financial pressure, which is the case for many
health-care institutions, all concerns about long-term risks tend to be subsumed
by the pressure to keep the doors open day-to-day.
C.

No-Fault Compensation
The third alternative to tort compensation is no-fault compensation (NFC)

for medical malpractice injuries.

This is the major focus of several research
84
No-fault compensation

groups and has been proposed since the early 1970s.

is in the workers' comp e nsation system for workplace injuries, and several
85
states have used limited no-fault compensation for automobile accidents.
86
The federal compensation systems for railroad workers, longshore and harbor
87
88
workers,
and seamen
use a modified no-fault system that depends on
showing a very small amount of fault. None of the proposed systems for no
fault

coverage for

medical

malpractice

injuries

effectively address

the

fundamental difference between medical practice and the areas where no-fault
has been used. In medicine, most patients have something wrong with them
when they seek treatment, something that under the best of circumstances may
not get better.

In contrast, an automobile accident no-fault system, o r a

worker' s compensation system generally deals with injuries that are clearly
attributable to the accident.

While both of these systems have to deal with

injuries to persons who had pre-existing problems similar to those attributed to
the accident, they represent a small fraction of the claims.

84. Clark C. Havighurst & Laurence R. Tancredi, "Medical Adversity lnsurance "-A NoFault Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance,

5 1 MILBANK Q. 1 25, 128 ( 1 973).

85. There are various opt-out provisions for serious injuries and pre-existing injuries.
86. 45 u.s.c. § 5 1 (2000).

87. 33 u.s.c. §§ 901-06 (2000).

8 8 . 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (2000).

r
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Medical injuries cannot be separated from unpreventable complications
89
without a finding of fault and causation.
The maj ority of medical malpractice
claims involve injuries that might be the natural consequence of the disease or
an unpreventable complication of the treatment.

In many cases there may be

questionable treatment, but it has nothing to do with the injury, i.e., there is no
causation.

Causation is only an issue in other no-fault systems when the

patient has a pre-existing illness that resembles the claimed injury. Yet even
90
establishing causation is not enough.
If the question is just whether the
treatment caused the inj ury, then every patient who suffered a complication of
treatment would be eligible for compensation.

Under such a system, a

significant fraction of all patients would be entitled to compensation. To avoid
having all complications become compensable,

a medical compensation

system must include a finding of improper adherence to medical standards, i.e.,
fault.
Advocates of current no-fault compensation systems assert that no-fault
coverage uniquely provides financial incentives to eliminate adverse medical
91
events.
This seems unlikely. If the current system, which focuses on
physicians, does not provide workable incentives to reduce injuries and thus
claims, spreading the risk over an even larger group would seem to further
undermine the incentive.
The major values of a workable no-fault coverage system would be
increased fairness to injured patients and the spreading of costs over the entire
92
93
Such a plan will not necessarily be less expensive.

health-care system.

Because no-fault coverage would theoretically eliminate the need to prove
negligence, it would facilitate the filing of smaller dollar-value cases. Not

89. For an excellent critique of the no-fault proposal from the Harvard Study, which is the
genesis of the IOM proposal, see Maxwell J. Mehlman, Saying "No" to No-Fault: What the
Harvard Malpractice Study Means for Medical Malpractice Reform, Address Before the Special
Committee on Medical Malpractice, New York State Bar Association (Jan. 199 1 ).

90. The best analogy is workers' compensation coverage for diseases with an occupational
component, such as stress-related heart disease. While states have taken different approaches to
determining compensation for such diseases, all of them depend on some type of analysis that
moves away from simple no-fault to an evaluation of the contribution of the workplace conditions
to the patient's overall health.

9 1 . David M. Studdert et al., Beyond Dead Reckoning: Meas ures of Medical Injury Burden,
Malpractice Litigation, and Alternative Compensation Models from Utah and Colorado, 33 IND.

L. REV. 1 643, 1 675 (2000); David M. Studdert et al., Can the United States Afford a "No-Fault "

System of Compensation for Medical Injury?, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 , 25-29 ( 1 997);

David M. Studdert

& Troyen A. Brennan, No-Fault Compensation for Medical Injuries: The

Prospect for Error Prevention, 286 JAMA 217, 221 (200 1 ) .
92. McLean, supra note 8 .

93. See generally Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidenc e of A dverse Events and Negligenc e in
Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Prac tice Study I, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED.
370 ( 1 99 1 ) (recognizing various costs associated with negligence in hospitalized patients).
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surprisingly, even the advocates of no-fault coverage are having difficulty
94
demonstrating the cost-effectiveness of medical no-fault coverage.
There are two no-fault plans for primary medical malpractice injuries in
the United States.

Both deal with birth injuries, an area where lovable

plaintiffs with long-term injuries increase the chance that juries will make huge
awards,

even in the

absence of clear medical

negligence.

Both

are

administrative compensation systems modeled after workers' compensation
systems. The Virginia plan uses a workers' compensation model and has the
workers' compensation board make the determination of whether a baby meets
95
the criteria for compensation under the plan.
The Virginia plan is voluntary
for physicians and hospitals, with only about seventy-five percent of the babies
96
If the physician or hospital participates
97
in the plan, it pre-empts any tort claims for the covered injuries.
If the baby
born in the state covered by the plan.

qualifies under the plan, h e or she can receive all necessary care, which often
exceeds the total value of awards under the capped Virginia tort system before
the attorney 's fees and insurance subrogations are deducted from the tort
98
The plan seems to be much more fair than the tort system in that

awards.

most of the award goes to the plaintiff and because there is no cap on the
necessary care.

Not all physicians participate because it is not necessarily

cheaper than medical malpractice insurance and because all physicians still
have to insure against injuries that are not covered by the fund. This plan, and
the cap on the tort system, seems to have stabilized medical malpractice
insurance rates for birth injuries, but this was at a time when rates were
generally stable in most states.
The Florida plan is very different, primarily because it is not an exclusive
99
In effect, the plan has a narrow definition of injury, which is also

remedy.

the extent of the preemption.
plaintiff prove causation,

100

The plan includes a requirement that the

and filing with the plan tolls the statute of

94. Studdert et al., Beyond Dead Reckoning, supra note 9 1 , at 1 677.
95. JOINT L EGI SLATIVE AUDIT & REVIEW COMM'N OF THE VA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, REVIEW
OF THE VIRGINIA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM, ii (Jan.
2003), available at http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/policy/Rpt284.pdf.
96.

Id. at 48.

97. Id. at 5.
98.

Id. at ii-iii.

99 . David M. Studdert et al. , The Jury Is Still In: Florida's Birth-Related Neurological
Injury Compensation Plan After a Decade, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 499, 5 1 7 (2000).

100. The injury must be ( 1 ) to the brain or spinal cord of a (2) live infant (3) weighing at least
2,500 grams at birth. It must be (4) caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury
and (5) occur in the course of labor, delivery, or resus-citation in the immediate
postdelivery period (as opposed to genetic or congenital abnormality). The birth must take
place (6) in a hospital. Finally, as a consequence of the injury, the infant must have been
(7) rendered permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired.
Id. at 503.
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If the plaintiff is turned down by the plan, the fact that the

plaintiff does not have a covered injury means that the plaintiff s claim is also
102
The
not pre-empted and the plaintiff can file a medical malpractice claim.
result is that while the plan has been fairer for the participating plaintiffs, it has
103
had little effect on the number of birth-injury claims filed in Florida.
To the extent that these plans work, it is because they use standard criteria
and an administrative review process. They are limited to a very narrow range
of injuries but, within these limits, the Virginia plan seems to be fairer than the
tort system for both patients and physicians.

The Florida plan is good for

patients but has only increased the compensation and medical malpractice
costs because it is not an exclusive remedy. Virginia is a better model, but it is
a reminder that equitable compensation for injuries is expensive. Neither plan
addresses deterrence by requiring risk management strategies to prevent or
reduce birth injuries. '04
IV. THE ADVENT OF FEDERAL QUALITY CREDENTIALING
Our proposal for an administrative compensation system for medical
malpractice injuries assumes that the IOM, working through CMS at the
federal

level,

will

successfully implement

a

national medical

quality

credentialing system. While the IOM' s proposed system does not assign fault
in individual cases, it does assign fault based on the physician' s aggregate
behavior.

The plan will be based on guidelines that are equivalent to legal

findings of standard of care which can be used as the basis for administrative
105
compensation.
Perhaps the most challenging hurdle to improving health quality and cost is
the need for a methodology to objectively rank physicians. Certainly, no one
wants an error-prone physician providing care to a family member.

On the

other hand, high quality physicians who rarely commit medical errors or have
adverse outcomes need to be identified, not only to reward the physicians'
good behavior, but also so we might all learn from these master healers.
A.

Traditional Method

Currently, there are two crude methods of measuring medical outcomes.
First, physicians have been rated by various consumer groups such as Public

1 0 1 . Id.
102. Id. at 517-19.
103. Id. at 504.
1 04. It would have been an interesting experiment to have required the use of a structured
prenatal care system as a condition of participation to find out if doing so could have reduced
i njuries.
1 05. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Administrative Law Approaches to Medical Malpractice Reform,
49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 45 (2004).
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Citizen.

106

95

Consumer group rankings generally suffer because they are based

on negative outcome, i.e., how often a physician has been sued or disciplined
by a board of medical examiners. Such rating systems not only fail to identify
quality providers but can also be misleading. Consumer group data is not
normalized by the volume of patients a physician cares for in a given time
period. Thus a physician with three claims in five years might be a part-time
physician who has treated relatively few patients or a front-line physician in a
m ajor hospital' s trauma department treating several times as many patients.
Consumer data also fails to account for the severity of the patient's underlying
illness.

A physician might have a high death rate because he or she is

recognized in the community as the best hope for complicated patients and
treats only the sickest patients.

Conversely, a surgeon with a very low

complication rate for a difficult procedure might be operating on people who
are not sick enough to need the procedure and thus are much more likely to
survive.

B.

Managed Care Method
The

second

crude

method

of rating

physicians

is

by

economic

credentialing. A widely used definition of economic credentialing is a system
for ranking physicians "solely on economic factors which are unrelated to the
107
individual ' s ability" as determined by peer review.
Basically, under this
system, the least cost-efficient physicians are deemed to be of the lowest
quality.

Physicians eschew economic credentialing because it is conceptually

possible to avoid having an adverse outcome if only they could do everything
possible.

Moreover, when hospitals engage in economic credentialing there
108
Unfortunately, economic credentialing is hard

are anti-kickback concerns.

to fight because the traditional alternative of peer review as the sole method for
judging physicians does not work as an objective yard stick of physician
109
quality.

C.

Patient Safety Method
It was against this background that the IOM published To Err is

Human. 1 10

In this monograph the IOM called for the development of clinical practice
guidelines.

This clarion call has been recently taken up by the National

I 06.

See Public Citizen,

1 07.

American College of Medical Quality, Professional Policies, Policy 19: Economic

Latest Public Citizen Publications, at http://www.citizen. org/

publications (last visited Nov. I , 2004).

Credentialing, at http://acmq.org/profess/policyl9.htm (last visited Nov. l , 2004).
1 08 .

Paul Danello, Economic Credentialing: Where is it Going? (2003), available at

http://articles.corporate.findlaw.com/articles/files/00989/009358.

R. McLean, Medical Rationing: The Implicit Result of Leadership by Example,

1 09.

Thomas

1 1 0.

See generally To ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 2 .

36 J. HEALTH L. 325, 337 (2003).
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Quality Forum (NQF).

l l1

More specifically, the NQF is recommending that

the health-care industry adopt clinical practice guidelines that are being
developed from

scientific

data collected by the Agency for

Healthcare

Research and Quality (AHRQ) and the Leapfrog Group to minimize iatrogenic
11 2
injury.
The power behind the NQF's recommendations comes from two
sources. First, the NQF is a consensus organization whose membership spans
.
1 13
' ' dua1s
Members vary f rom m d iv1
all facets of the health-care industry.

concerned with improving health care to Fortune 500 companies. Because the

NQF' s recommendations represent the consensus of its membership, it is
reasonable to

assume

that

the

individual

members

will

adopt

these

r ecommendations as their own. When a Fortune 500 company, or other large
purchaser of health care, adopts the NQF's recommen dations, it is likely that
these recom mendations will be incorporated into the employer ' s health plans.
This of course has an important implication: If a medical service is not
provided in accordance with the NQF ' s recommendations, it is possible that
the medical service rendered will not be considered properly payable.
The second power source behind the NQF' s recommen datio n s is an act
that is little known in health-care circles : the National Techn ology Transfer
11 4
and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA).
Enacted to facilitate information

transfer in the electronic and telecommun ication industries, nothi n g prevents
NITAA from being utilized in the health-care industry.

NTIAA directs

government organizations that elect to develop objective standards to adopt,

absent a compelling reason to the contrary, the objective standards of an
1 15
industry if they are articulated by a "consensus organization."
Although
"consensus organizations" is a defined term, Dr. Ken Kizer, CEO of NQF,

stated publicly that, not only does the NQF meet the definition of a consensus
organization, but it was also specifically designed to exploit the power granted
116
by NTTAA.
Accordingly, if a governmental agency, such as CMS, is
interested in adopting patient safety standards in health care, then the agency
11 7
must con sider NQF recommendations very strongly.
There is no question the government is going to adopt guidelines because
the greatest impediment to controlling health-care cost is the autonomous

1 1 1 . NAT'L QUALITY FORUM, SAFE PRACTICES FOR BETTER HEALTH CARE,

v

(2003),

available athttp://www.qualityforum.org/txsafeexecsumm+order6-8-03PUBLIC.pdf.

1 1 2. Id. at v-vi.
Quality
Forum,
About
1 1 3 . National
http://www.qualityforum.org/about/home.htm.

the

National

Quality

Forum,

at

1 1 4 . Pub. L. No. 104- 1 1 3 , 1 1 0 Stat. 775 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3701 (2000)).
1 1 5. Pub. L. No. 104- 1 1 3 (codified as amended at 1 5 U.S .C. § 272 (1996)).
1 1 6. Ken Kizer, Address at the Cerner Millennium Conference, Kansas City, Mo. (Sept. 1 1 ,
200 1 ).
1 1 7. Thomas R. McLean, Application of Administrative Law to Health Care Reform: The
Real Politik of Crossing the Quality Chasm, 1 6 J.L. & Health 65, 74 (2001 -2002).
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physician . 1 1 8

In a recent GAO report on medical inflation, the government

observed that the American economy is about to break under the weight of this
important economic force . 1 19 Accordingly, to tame medical inflation the GAO
has called for a significant increase in individual provider-specific outcomes
data.120 With such data, the GAO argues that cost-efficient providers should
be rewarded and cost-inefficient providers encouraged "to emulate [the] best
practices" of other providers. 121

The GAO goes on to add that individual

providers, and especially physicians, need to have their practice pattern
monitored, and where there is deviation from the best practice, the provider
should be held accountable. 1 22 In this regard the GAO observes that it will be
necessary to develop "an authoritative source of reference for the public,
providers, and payers on what constitutes effective care."123
In

Leadership by Example the IOM encouraged the phasing in of

g uidelines for the fifteen diseases that account for eighty-five percent of
health-care costs. 124 Guidelines will create a bright-line test to determine if a
physician is delivering quality care. To illustrate, consider a guideline that
states: If a ten-year-old child presents with a fever, a sore throat, and clinical
findings consistent with a bacterial infection, the standard of care treatment is
outpatient penicillin. 125 If a physician sees a ten year old with a sore throat, the
physician can comply with the guideline and prescribe penicillin, or the
physician can document a contra indication to penicillin and treat with another
antibiotic. If the physician follows the guideline and prescribes penicillin, the
IOM would consider this to be quality care. 126 If the physician does not

1 1 8.

McLean, supra note 8.

1 1 9.

U.S.

GEN.

ACCOUNTING

OFFICE,

PUB.

NO.

GA0-04-793SP,

HEALTH

CARE:

UNSUS TAINABLE TRENDS NECESSITATE COMPREHENSIVE AND FuNDAMENTAL REFORMS TO

CONTROL SPENDING AND IMPROVE vALUE 25

(2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/

new.items/d04 793sp.pdf.
1 20.

Id. at 20.

121.

Id. at 1 2.

1 22.

Id. at 2 1 .

1 23.

Id. at 1 7-18.

1 24.

COMM. ON ENHANCING FED. HEALTHCARE QUALITY PROGRAM, INST. OF MED.,

LEADERSHIP BY EXAMPLE: COORDINATING GoVERNMENT ROLES IN IMPROVING HEALTH CARE
QUALITY [hereinafter LEADERSHIP BY EXAMPLE]. See also McLean, supra note 1 17, at 7�7 1 .
1 25 .

This would be standard treatment today; however, many physicians prescribe more

expensive antibiotics. If a physician is asked why the more expensive antibiotic was prescribed,
the standard answers are that it is

as

effective

as

penicillin and has fewer side effects. Assuming

that the drug is as effective as penicillin, the reason the drug has few side effects is because the
drug will be new to the market. Plus, if the physician does not prescribe this drug, they will never
receive any more favors from the drug reps who are pushing the more expensive drugs.
1 26.

COMM. ON DATA STANDARDS FOR PATIENT SAFETY, INST. OF MED., PATIENT SAFETY:

ACHIEVING A NEW STANDARD FOR CARE 30 (Philip Aspden et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter
PATIENT SAFETY].
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comply, automated data analysis programs scanning the required electronic
127
medical records will flag the record for further review.
Non-compliance can result in two outcomes.

First, if the non-compliant

event was a significant deviation from the standard of care that potentially
threatened injury to the patient, immediate remedial action would be set into
128
129
The
place.
This might range from counseling to disciplinary action.
reviewer might also determine that the physician properly documented a valid
reason for the deviation and the case would be closed. Most deviations would
not be acute threats to the patient, but, in the aggregate, they would constitute
substandard care. For example, assume that a physician violated the guideline

for treating sore

throats in children statistically more frequently than
130
comparable physicians,
the physician would then be offered an opportunity
to explain the deviation. If the physician has not properly documented that his
patient population justifies different treatment, t h e p hysician will be subject to
remedial actions, including limitations on the physician's right to care for
federally funded patients or to practice in facilities that care for those
131
patients.
While not a finding of fault in an individual case, this will be a
much more powerful deterrent than having the malpractice insurer pay a
settlement or judgment,

which does not affect the physician's ability to

practice.

D.

Value-Based Purchasing: Putting Teeth into Clinical Guidelines
In Leadership by Example, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) encourages the

federal government to use its unique purchasing p ower in the health-care sector
132
to reform the system.
I n particular, the IOM recommends that the
133
government adopt "value-based purchasing."
Value-based purchasing
134
rewards vendors who provide high-quality goods and services.
Value-based
purchasing is characterized by:

"(1)

disclosure

of

comparative

quality

1 27.

Robert A. Guyton, Quo Vadimus?, 78 ANNALS THORACIC SURGERY 39 1 , 395 (2004) .

1 28.

Even before the days of patient safety it was possible for a physician to order a drug in

violation of a guideline and be immediately investigated. See Lee v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., No.
00-07 1 6-CY-W-HFS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1800, at *3-4 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 29, 2004).
1 29 . Prior to the establishment of patient safety guidelines it was possible to summarily
suspend a physician's privileges. See Med. Staff of Sharp Mem'l Hosp. v. Superior Court of San
Diego County, 1 2 1 Cal. App. 4th 1 7 3 , 176 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
1 30. While a detailed discussion of statistics is not within the scope of this paper, it is
sufficient to say that when there is a statistically significant difference between two physicians,
this difference is not due to chance alone; there must be
13l .

a

reason.

A similar analysis can be done for surgical outcomes that

are

not subject to clinical

practice guidelines. If the surgeon has too many complications, the surgeon will have to explain
why his or her patients do not fair as well. See generally McLean, supra note 8.
1 32 . LEADERSHIP BY EXAMPLE, supra note 1 24, at 6.
1 33 .

Id. at 67.

1 34.

Id.
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information to encourage consumers and purchasers to choose the highest
quality providers, and (2) selective purchasing or payment incentives to
135
providers and beneficiaries."
According to the IOM, value-based
purchasing would return the best price while c reating the right incentives for
health-care
services.

' -10

providers

to

provide

high-quality

(i.e.,

error-free)

medical

Moving to value-based purchasing will mean that safety data that is
provider-specific will need to be gathered. Safety data, as used here, is broadly
defined to cover near misses as well as actual errors.
A

near

miss is defined as an act of commission or omission that could have

h armed the patient but did not do so as a result of chance (e.g., the patient
received a contraindicated drug but did not experience an adverse drug
reaction). prevention (e.g., a potentially lethal overdose was prescribed, but a
nurse identified the error before administering the medication), or mitigation
(e .g., a lethal drug was overdose was administered but discovered early and
1 37
countered with an antidote).

Even without harm being caused to a patient, a near miss will identify an event
that may increase front-end cost (e.g., unnecessary testing) or back-end costs
(e.g., litigation). Conversely, near misses may reveal methods to control cost
on the front end (e.g. a more efficient way to care for patients) or the back end
(e.g., a safer way to care for patients).

It is hard to imagine a value-based

purchasing system that would ignore this information. After all, the purpose of
shifting health care to value-based purchasing is precisely to identify and
reward good providers and weed out the bad providers.
The threat of weeding out sub-quality providers will be a strong incentive
for physicians to conform to objective standards of care. Physicians will not
be able to accumulate errors and near misses. If they do, their employers will
have to conclude that they are not physicians of quality.

Moreover, in a

rational world one would expect that once an employer has concluded that a
physician is not of quality, that employer would not renew the physician ' s
138
In short, in the near future physicians will be credentialed based on
contract.
quality.

Such credentialing will not be solely economic, nor will it be a

resection of peer review.

1 35.

Id.

1 36.

Id.

1 37.

PATIENT SAFETY, supra note 126, at 30.

1 38.

Once quality credentialing is up and running, non-renewal of a physician's contract will

be a fatal scarlet letter on the physician's resume.

Non-renewal will signal that the physician

inappropriately prescribes medical treatment at the very least and may signal a deeper flaw such
as alcoholism or criminal propensity. In a world looking for quality physicians, non-renewal will
be a red flag to future employers.
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V. ELEMENTS OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE COMPENSATION SYSTEM
Federal quality credentialing removes both the deterrence and punishment
1 39
Federalizing

aspects of tort law, leaving only compensation to be addressed.

the standards for medical quality review is critical because it removes the
rationale for jury-determined standards of care. As happened in the federal
1 40
a uniform federal standard for

pre-emption cases for medical devices,

medical quality should pre-empt state tort law findings contrary to the federal
41
standards. 1
The federalizing of standards is critical because only the federal
government can
compensation.
compensation.

142

impose
No

state

a

uniform

is

national

prepared

to

system of administrative

move

to pure

administrative

It is in the interest of the federal government to establish

objective standards because it would be fairer to patients, which is consistent
with the patient safety movement, and because it would eliminate the tension
between federal practice guidelines and state tort efforts to undermine those
guidelines, as has been seen with some state efforts to undermine private
quality and cost controls. 143

The alternative is complete pre-emption of tort

claims, as ERISA provides for health plans, which is far less fair than an
144
administrative compensation system.
An administrative system to deal with compensation does not need to be
perfect, only better than the tort system. There are four important lessons to
draw

from the tort system as a method for compensation for medical

negligence injuries.

First, the only compensation is for serious injuries.

Second, most of the dollars in the system go to lawyers and the medical
malpractice insurer.

Even the plaintiff s settlement seldom nets more than

sixty percent of the settlement value, and, in many cases, less than fifty percent
of the gross settlement. Third, because of state collateral source rules, medical
care and other insured costs are often paid twice.

Fourth, the randomnes s in

the tort system cuts both ways. Just as physicians sometimes lose claims that

1 39. Because monetary awards, even big verdicts, are almost always settled within insurance
limits for the physician, even a punitive damage award is not really a punishment. Limitations on
medical practice, which can be imposed through quality credentialing, are a very real punishment.
140. Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc., 273 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2001 ) ; Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254
F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 2001); Massachusetts v. Hayes, 691 F.2d 57 ( 1 st Cir. 1982).

1 4 1 . Congress can give a federal agency the power to pre-empt state Jaw. See New York v.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 535 U.S. 1 , 18 (2002) ("[A] federal agency may pre-empt state
law only when and if it is acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority.").
1 42. While trial lawyers are the visible opposition, such systems also threaten defense lawyers
and the medical malpractice insurance industry.

There is no push for administrative

compensation by physicians because they fear the traditional problem of an explosion of claims if
the system lowers the transaction costs.
143. See generally Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002) (forcing a
managed-care company to provide a medically unnecessary and costly procedure).
144. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 1 24 S. Ct. 2488, 2495 (2004).
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are

medically unfounded,
145
founded.

patients also

lose

claims that are

B ut compensation does not have to work this way.

medically

The Virginia birth

injury system shows that even a simple administrative compensation system
will put more money in the hands of injured persons and less in transaction
costs than the tort system.

It demonstrates that by providing for flexible

payments of future medical-care needs, the system assures long-term care, one
of the biggest failures of the tort system.

The Virginia system also takes

advantage of other available insurance and only pays costs that are not
otherwise insured. Implicit in the definition of a birth injury is the notion of a
severe injury, which ensures that the system is not susceptible to swamping
with low-level claims that would not be compensated under the tort system.
While the Virginia birth injury compensation system provides u seful
146
les sons, it cannot be generalized because of the narrowness of its coverage.
A general compensation system could not have a listed set of compensable
conditions because the potential variation is too large. The system will have to
depend on expert review of claims. This is already done by medical review
panels in several states, but these depend on the tort system to present the
claims. A better parallel i s the Social Security Disability system.
A.

The Social Security Disability Model
A person making a claim for disability must fill out forms that show the

person is not gainfully employed or making more than the allowable limits for
147
a disabled person.
The claimant must also provide medical records and
physician' s statements documenting the nature of the mental or physical
1 48
These
condition that makes it i mpossible for the claimant to work.
documents are reviewed by a disability examiner to determine if the claimant
149
has a condition that has been legally determined to be disabling.
This list o f
50
If the
conditions i s established b y administrative regulation or by statute. 1
person ' s condition is listed, then they are automatically determined to be
1 45. While there is no good data on this, it is likely that patients lose more deserving cases
than physicians lose undeserving cases. Because medical malpractice defense is usually done by
experienced

attorneys

with

adequate

working

budgets,

physicians

generally

get

good

representation. Patients who have the bad luck of picking an inexperienced lawyer who does not

refer the case to an expert lawyer will often lose meritorious claims. Even experienced lawyers

want to maximize their return on the work invested and will often drop a case if it looks difficult
to win, even if it is meritorious.

1 46. There are other limitations associated with the Virginia and Florida birth compensation
systems. First, both systems allow an injured party to have the option of using the tort system.
Second, despite these systems being termed no-fault coverage, they are, like tort law, fault-based.

1 47. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335-36 ( 1 976).
1 48. See id. at 336.

1 49. Id. at 335.
1 50. Heckler v. Campbell, 46 1 U.S. 458, 459-60 (1983).
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disabled.

151

If the condition does not fit a listed condition, then the examiner

has a protocol to evaluate the claimant' s overall condition and job skills to
152
determine if they are otherwise disabled.
This review is done entirely on the written records submitted to the agency.
If these records are insufficient, the agency can ask the person to submit to a
physical evaluation by an independent physician, who will make a report to the
153
agency to supplement the claimant' s records .
If the claimant is turned down
for benefits, he can require a hearing before an administrative law j udge to
154
This process was challenged as violating the

contest the agency's findings.

claimant's right to due process because there was no right to a hearing before
155
the initial agency determination.
The United States Supreme Court ruled
156
that this process provided constitutionally adequate due process.
The Court
found that the cost of a hearing on all claims before the initial determination
was not cost effective because it would not result in significantly more
157
accurate determinations.
The right to be heard after the determination of
158
disability was sufficient.
This same type of review could be done to determine whether a patient
who received negligent care was injured by that c are, and, if so, how much the
The system could use uniform

patient is entitled to for compensation.

standards for economic losses and use independent experts as necessary. Such
a

review would be more

accurate and more efficient than

a judicial

determination. Unlike medical malpractice cases, in which standards are based
on

the

persuasiveness

of

experts

and

not

scientific

validity,

these

administrative panels could publish their standards so that the process would
be transparent.

The compensation review should be kept separate from the

quality credentialing process, at least to the extent that whether there was a
compensation award should not be considered as part of quality credentialing.
Quality decisions must be made on the health care rendered, not the vagaries of
the

patient' s reaction

to

the

care.

Conversely,

quality

credentialing

information would be an important consideration in determining if the c are fell
below the acceptable standard and was thus compensable.
B.

Controlling the Costs of Compensation
The first limitation on the system should be the level of compensation. As

with the Social Security Disability system, the claimant should have to show
151.

Id. at 460.

1 52.

Id.

153.

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 337.

1 54.

Id. at 339.

1 55 .

See id. a t 324-25.

1 56.

Id. at 349.

1 5 7.

Id. at 347.

1 5 8.

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349.
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significant injury, which could include large unpaid medical costs. The system
should take into accoun t all other insurance proceeds and social wel fare
programs and only pay otherwise uncompensated costs. The payments should
be tailored to provide adequate income for ordinary wage earners, not highly
paid w orkers.

There should be no compensation for emotional injuries in

themselves, but compensation should include any treatments that might
ameliorate the injuries.

Highly paid workers w h o want to assure they w ill

receive full compensation for injures should be expected to purchase first-party
1 0
159
insurance
to cover employment income or business losses and disability . 6
This shifts the burden of paying for extra protection to those who can best
1 1
afford it and best determine the level of risk that they want to assume. 6
B ecause the largest damage awards under such a system would be for
medical care, especially future care for permanent injuries, as they are u nder
the current tort system, b roadening the reach of the medical insurance system
would reduce the potential payouts. Under a single payor national health
1 2
i n s urance system, 6 all medical care costs would be removed from the
compensation system. More generally, b y eliminating the collateral source
1 3
rule, 6 a national health system would eliminate the major damages in all tort
cases, not just those under an administrative compensation system. Ironically,
universal access to medical care coupled with an elimination of the collateral
1 64
source rule would eliminate the major damage engine in tort law.
C.

Paying for the Costs of Compensation
The fairest way to pay for compen sation for medical negligence injuries

under a working quality credentialing system would be as a tax on the proceeds
of

the health-care system.

Rich surgeons

would

pay more than poor

pediatricians, and rich s p ecialty hospitals would pay more than community

1 59.

See Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient: In Search of Non-Debt-Based Alt ernatives,

69 BROOK. L. REV. 453, 48 1 (2004).
1 60.

This might even be done on a per procedure basis, as is done with flight insurance.

161.

George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.

1 52 1 , 1 550--61 (1987).

But see Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance

Ext ernality: An Economic Just ification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129 ( 1 990).
1 62.

See COMM. ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE, INST. OF MED., INSURING

AMERICA'S HEALTH: PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 3 1 (2004); David u. Himmelstein

& Steffie Woolhandler, Nat ional Healt h Insurance or Incremental Reform: Aim High, or At Our
Feet ?, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, Jan. 1, 2003, at 102.
1 63 . This would be logical because the policy rationale for the rule is to encourage the
purchase of insurance, which would no longer be relevant.

1 64.

This could have a profound effect on small auto accident cases and other cases where the

major part of the recovery is usually based on the insurer paying at two to four times the cost of
the medical care, which the attorney conspires to raise by working with friendly medical care
providers who pile on unnecessary and sometimes dangerous care.
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hospitals that served the poor. 1

65

[Vol. 49:73

.
Even under the current system, sh1. ftmg

payment for compensation to a tax on profits would be much more fair than the
current system, where good physicians underwrite bad physicians who often
make much more money through their shoddy and dangerous practices.
VI. C ONCLUSION
While the debate over tort versus administrative compensation for medical
negligence injuries is not new, what is new is the development of a national
quality credentialing system for physicians and hospitals.

This system

implicitly recognizes the failure of tort law to provide useful deterrence
66
By providing
signals, especially when cost of care is also a consideration . 1
an independent system for assuring quality medical care, the federal
government must be concerned with state tort actions that will undermine the
effectiveness of the national system, both b y second-guessing the federal
standards and by using them in unintended ways. Using the power of federal
pre-emption to substitute an administrative compensation system would protect
the federal standards for quality care. At the same time, it would redress the
deep unfairness of the current tort system, which neither fairly compensates
injured patients nor fairly allocates the cost of compensation across the health
c are system.

1 65 . The federal government pays about forty percent no matter how the system is structured
because the federal government buys about forty percent of the health care in the United States.
Stuart M. Gerson & Jennifer E. Gladieux, Advice of Counsel: Eroding Confidentiality in Federal
Health Care law,

5 1 ALA. L. REV. 1 63, 1 7 1 (1999).

1 66. It also recognizes the failure of state medical licensing boards to enforce even

�dimentary quality standards, thus

supporting the argument of tort lawyers that that tort system

is the only check on poor-quality medical care.
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different sources and the integration of this data into a general
model of risk management intervention.10
II.

THE

ECONOMICS O F

RISK MANAGEMENT

Risk management efforts must save more money than they
cost if they are to be acceptable to business. It does not make eco
nomic sense to spend $100 to prevent a risk whose occurrence will
cost only ten dollars. 1 1 While it may be socially desirable to pre
vent injuries to workers, a corporation would cheat its shareholders
if it spent more to prevent injuries than it saved through those
expenditures.12 In most situations it is cost-effective to prevent in
juries, but this decision must be based on economic data, not on
appeals to corporate paternalism. The old corporate controls based
on government regulation have proven unacceptable, but corpora
tions have begun to realize that the

�tive of regulation
more cos#. than government regu

through Jitigation can be much
lation. 18 Thia new litigati on
te de'8Dda that corporations
quic kly develop mechanisma to manage dab, lelt they face cata
strophic losses from unanticipated litiga.n.
·

There are three contributiona to the • of rilk takina behav
ior. The first is the direct cost due to the OCCJUftllc e of the risk.
This includes the 1088 of skilled pe rsonnel, machine downtime, and
other factors that reduce productivity, as well as the payment of
com pensation to the injured party. The second is the cost of the
efforts to prevent or manage the risk before its occurrence. The
gal Syste m Can it Be Analyzed to Suit the Scientist?, in ScmHTlSTS IN THK l..sGAL YSTKM
(W. Thomas ed. 1 974).
10. For a discussion of the importance of model building, see R. PouND, SOCIAL CON·
TROL THROUGH LAW ( 1942). As Profe880r Pound stated: "Theories of what i1 have a marked

effect upon ideas of what ought to be. Men tend to do what they think they are doing." Id.
at 26. Another commentator has noted that "[t]he function of a general theory of law i1 not
to discover the immediate sources of law, however important that may be in the atudy of a
particular area, but to segregate the factors which operate in all areas in the creation, modi·

ficatio n, transformation and disappearance of legal a)'ltema." H. CADlNS, Tm Tu.BORY or

LEGAL SClENCE 89 ( 1 969).

1 1 . For an analysis of the economic basis of tort law and ita impact on risk taking, aee
tevens, Medical Malpractice: Some /mplicatiom of Contract and Arbitration in HM0'1,
59 Mil.BAN K MEMO
RIAL FuND Q./HBALTH AND Socirrv , 59, 66 ( 1981). See allo C. TONK,
W H.ERB Tm LAw ENDS, Tus Socw. C oNTROL or CoRPORATS BKHAvtoa 33 ( 1975).
12. This is certainly true if the expenditures cauaed the corporation to 10 out of buai
n
For a d iscussion of the merita of this view in leaa draatic circU1D.1tancee, aee C. STONE,
supra note 1 1 ,
at 75.
1 3. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prada. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 4 1 U.S
869 ( 1974).
9
·

.

